Split between accelerationists, pivoters, and the unwavering:
CEE energy policy responses to Russia’s 2022 invasion
by John Szabó
The article “Split between accelerationists, pivoters, and the unwavering: CEE energy policy responses to Russia’s 2022 invasion” examines how Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU Member States responded to the shock of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, particularly in relation to energy security, natural gas dependence, and climate policy. We argue that the invasion constituted a critical juncture in EU energy governance, empowering the European Commission to more tightly integrate energy security concerns with climate policy objectives. However, despite this shared shock and a broadly similar structural dependence on Russian gas, CEE Member States responded in markedly different ways. To capture these differences, the article proposes a taxonomy of national responses—accelerationists, pivoters, and the unwavering—grounded in institutional theory and the concepts of politicisation and securitisation. The authors demonstrate that variation in responses cannot be explained simply by infrastructure, economic capacity, or energy mixes, but instead reflects divergent institutional trajectories, threat perceptions, and political choices.
The article’s analysis primarily draws on new institutional theory, particularly historical and discursive institutionalism. Institutions are understood as durable but adaptable configurations of rules, norms, and practices that shape policy outcomes over time. Energy transitions are framed as slow-moving processes characterised by path dependence, where change typically occurs incrementally unless disrupted by external shocks. Russia’s invasion is conceptualised as such a shock. However, shocks do not determine outcomes on their own. Instead, the direction and form of institutional change depend on how political actors interpret and frame the shock. Here, the concepts of securitisation and politicisation are central. Securitisation refers to framing an issue as an existential threat requiring urgent and exceptional measures, while politicisation denotes heightened salience and contestation within normal politics. Following the invasion, the European Commission increasingly framed dependence on Russian fossil fuels as a security threat intertwined with climate risks. This framing enabled the Commission to push for accelerated decarbonisation and reduced gas use through instruments such as REPowerEU and the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) process. Yet Member States varied in whether—and how—they adopted this integrated framing.
The article compares original NECPs submitted in 2019 with updated or draft updated NECPs developed after the invasion. It focuses on seven countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Austria, examining changes in projected greenhouse gas emissions, coal phaseout trajectories, natural gas demand, gas infrastructure investments, and plans for renewable gases such as biogas and hydrogen. These dimensions allow the paper to explore whether countries responded to the invasion by accelerating the energy transition, pivoting gas supply sources, or largely maintaining existing institutional paths.
Accelerationists
Accelerationists are countries that align closely with the European Commission’s strategy by coupling energy security with an accelerated transition away from fossil fuels, including natural gas. Austria and Lithuania fall into this category. Lithuania represents a case of long-term securitisation of Russian energy, having diversified away from Russian gas well before 2022 through LNG imports. After the invasion, it further intensified its transition efforts, significantly raising renewable energy targets, especially for wind and solar, and aiming for near-complete renewable electricity generation. Natural gas is increasingly confined to niche or balancing roles, with growing emphasis on biogas, hydrogen, and efficiency measures. The updated NECP reflects a clear institutional shift away from gas dependence altogether. Austria, by contrast, had historically relied heavily on Russian gas and had resisted diversification. The invasion prompted a more abrupt transformation. Austria’s updated NECP signals an intention to phase out Russian fossil fuels and, more importantly, to reduce overall gas demand through electrification, building renovation, renewable deployment, and renewable gas substitution. Austria thus moved from an “unwavering” stance to an accelerationist one, layering new objectives onto existing institutions while repurposing them to support decarbonisation and security simultaneously.
Pivoters
Pivoters acknowledge the security risk posed by dependence on Russian gas and take decisive action to eliminate Russian imports, but they do not significantly reduce their reliance on natural gas itself. Instead, they substitute Russian supplies with alternatives while maintaining gas as a transition fuel. Bulgaria, Czechia, and Poland are classified as pivoters. Poland had long treated Russian gas as a strategic threat and had already invested heavily in LNG terminals and pipeline diversification before 2022. Its updated NECP reflects continuity rather than acceleration: gas demand remains stable or increases slightly, particularly to support coal phaseout, while renewables and nuclear energy expand in parallel. Although Poland pursues biogas and hydrogen, the Commission judges these ambitions insufficient to meaningfully reduce gas use in the medium term. Czechia similarly pivoted away from Russian gas after the invasion, relying on LNG imports via neighbouring countries and Norwegian supplies. Its updated NECP maintains a strong role for gas as coal is phased out, with future decarbonisation hinging on renewable gases rather than demand reduction. The strategy prioritises supply security and infrastructural integration over accelerated gas phaseout. Bulgaria’s pivot was triggered by Gazprom’s unilateral supply cut in 2022. Despite deep historical ties to Russian energy, Bulgaria rapidly secured alternative supplies via Greece and Türkiye. Its NECP continues to view gas as central, particularly for heating and balancing power generation, while justifying new gas infrastructure as “hydrogen-ready.” Although renewable targets increase modestly, gas remains firmly embedded in the country’s energy trajectory.
The unwavering
The final category, the unwavering, includes Hungary and Slovakia. These countries neither fully securitise Russian gas dependence nor significantly alter their energy strategies in response to the invasion. Instead, they emphasise cost, technical constraints, and the lack of alternatives, resulting in institutional drift rather than transformation. Hungary openly defends continued Russian gas imports and shows little intention of reducing gas demand. Its updated NECP maintains a substantial role for gas-fired power generation and offers limited diversification efforts. While solar power has expanded rapidly, gas remains central to Hungary’s energy system, and biogas ambitions are modest. Slovakia adopts a more cautious rhetorical stance, formally supporting EU objectives while highlighting technical and contractual barriers to diversification. After the halt of Ukrainian transit, Slovakia continued receiving Russian gas via Hungary. Its NECP introduces few new commitments and largely relies on existing measures, with hydrogen framed more as a future possibility than a concrete alternative.
Conclusions
The article concludes that Russia’s invasion significantly strengthened the European Commission’s role in energy governance by enabling a closer integration of climate and security objectives. However, this did not produce uniform convergence among Member States. Instead, responses reflected pre-existing institutional paths, political alignments, and interpretations of security. Accelerationists embraced the crisis as an opportunity to deepen decarbonisation; pivoters focused on replacing Russian gas without abandoning gas-based systems; and the unwavering resisted meaningful change. The paper suggests that these divergent responses highlight both the limits and the growing power of EU-level governance. While the Commission has become more interventionist and “state-like,” national institutions and politics continue to shape how external shocks translate into policy outcomes.
Szabo, J., Weiner, C., & Deák, A. (2026).
Split between accelerationists, pivoters, and the unwavering:
CEE energy policy responses to Russia’s 2022 invasion.
Post-Communist Economies, 1–28.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2025.2607994
